Book Notes: A Woman\u27s Wage: Historical Meanings and Social Consequences. by Alice Kessler-Harris. by Farber, Dianne S.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1992
Book Notes: A Woman's Wage: Historical
Meanings and Social Consequences. by Alice
Kessler-Harris.
Dianne S. Farber
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Farber, Dianne S., "Book Notes: A Woman's Wage: Historical Meanings and Social Consequences. by Alice Kessler-Harris." (1992).
Constitutional Commentary. 264.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/264
Book Notes 
A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND 
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES. By Alice Kessler-Harris. Lex-
ington: The University Press of Kentucky. 1990. Pp. xiii, 
168. $10.00 (paper). 
A Woman's Wage is based on the 1988 series of Blaze Lectures 
presented by Alice Kessler-Harris at the University of Kentucky. 
Kessler-Harris is a feminist professor of history at Temple Univer-
sity and a nationally known scholar on women and work. 
Kessler-Harris has attempted to trace women's progress from 
"economic dependence to relative independence in the twentieth 
century and from family to individual lives." She says each lecture 
is "rooted in a body of empirical data," but that they are offered "in 
the speculative and reflective spirit of an ongoing conversation." 
The speculative, reflective nature of this "conversation" makes 
for repetition, ambiguity, and confusion. Yet, Kessler-Harris 
makes some interesting points. For example, she asserts several 
times that consumerism has been a driving force keeping women in 
the workplace since at least World War I. She notes that, after 
World War II, contrary to some popular feminist assertions, wo-
men were encouraged to stay in the work force because they en-
hanced productivity to increase consumption. Keynesian 
economics demanded participation of women both as workers and 
consumers. In exchange for encouraging women to stay in the 
work force, occupations were kept segregated to protect male jobs. 
There is a thread that unites this rambling analysis of the wage: 
the concept of separate male and female spheres. Chapter 1 de-
scribes tum-of-the-century attempts to create a differential women's 
wage based on need-need being tied to ideas of women as depen-
dent family members. Chapter 2 is a long discussion of the Progres-
sive Era that describes the Supreme Court's 1923 decision in Adkins 
v. Children's Hospital striking down a Washington D.C. minimum 
wage law. Presaging today's fight between feminists who want pro-
tective legislation for women and those who want none on the 
grounds of equal rights, the minimum wage battle had evolved out 
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of the idea of separate spheres and the related protective legislation 
for women that recognized their nurturing role. Interestingly, the 
court found the minimum wage unconstitutional by declaring that 
differences between men and women "have come almost, if not 
quite, to the vanishing point. . . . " 
Yet in Chapter 3, Kessler-Harris takes feminist historians to 
task by questioning the historical validity of the notion of separate 
spheres. Kessler-Harris argues that the separate spheres idea actu-
ally affirms inequality by (1) putting gendered bonding above all 
other forms of connectedness, (2) organizing historical data to em-
phasize potential inequalities, and (3) inhibiting the historian's abil-
ity to imagine non-dichotomous, non-oppositional thoughts and 
behavior. She further notes that the idea of separate spheres has 
justified the failure to make common cause across gender lines. She 
argues that reality is more complex. 
Kessler-Harris comes back to separate spheres again in Chap-
ter 5 while discussing the idea of comparable worth. She admits 
that women have behaved as if they believed in separate spheres, 
that they have worked in segregated job categories, but says this 
behavior is the product of deeply ingrained attitudes that some wo-
men have challenged. Then she states that 
new material conditions have shifted the content of equity from a 
demand for equality with men to a challenge to male structures. 
The altered terms of the debate no longer ask how women can 
achieve equality in a predominantly male work world so much as 
how to revalue the world of work and workers in a way that 
incorporates female self-interest. Rooted not in the moral econ-
omy of the male, but in the traditions, customs, and practices of 
women, the idea of comparable worth evokes a history that as-
sesses the changing sense of right or dignity on which people will 
act. 
Kessler-Harris's change of language is startling when she falls 
back on the terminology of separate spheres in discussing compara-
ble worth. She goes on to assert that comparable worth "sustains 
those qualities of womanhood-nurture, community, and relational 
abilities .... " This certainly seems to be the language of domestic-
ity. Kessler-Harris then tries to clarify these contradictory 
assertions: 
While social and cultural differences between men and women 
surely exist, their abstract expression is less instructive than 
clear-eyed analysis of it in historical context. Second, such anal-
ysis should not be allowed to obscure differences among women 
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and the historically specific ways in which they manifest them-
selves and serve as sources of tension and change. 
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Perhaps Kessler-Harris means that separate spheres should be 
used only in discussions of comparable worth. Or perhaps she has 
been toying with the reader and is merely illustrating the point she 
already made in Chapter 3: 
Suppose we crossed what Linda Kerber called the boundaries of 
hermeneutics and asked not "What is the meaning of work?" or 
"What gendered images does it construct?" but "How is work 
interpreted by those who do it?" or "how have the orientations of 
observers shaped the boundaries with which we conceive the 
work of others?" ... We take our cue, then, from the methods of 
Foucault who suggests that destabilizing the language with 
which we describe experience may in fact tell us something of the 
experience itself. And we attempt to understand difference, not 
as a single necessary dichotomy, but as a set of intersecting cir-
cles of experience that together structure consciousness. 
Dianne S. Farber 
LOWERING THE WALL: RELIGION AND THE 
SUPREME COURT IN THE 1980s. By Gregg Ivers. An-
tidefamation League: New York. 1991. Pp. vii, 108. $14.95. 
Convinced that church-state law under the Supreme Court 
during the 1980s took "a giant-and unwelcome step-backward," 
Gregg Ivers's book explores the changing relationship between reli-
gion and the state. Those looking for a neutral account of this rela-
tionship should look elsewhere. This book, commissioned by the 
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, is a liberal's response to 
use of the courts by "[r]eligious conservatives, encouraged by the 
election of Ronald Reagan," to create a "broad wave of conserva-
tive religious populism" in pursuit of school prayer, financial assist-
ance for parochial institutions and equal access to public school 
facilities for student religious clubs. 
In six short chapters, Ivers examines Supreme Court cases of 
the past decade seeking to expose the erosion of the first amendment 
establishment and free exercise clauses. He begins by analyzing 
political influence over the Court, and what he perceives to be the 
Court's new respect and tolerance for the will of legislative majori-
ties, as opposed to its prior role of vigorous protector of the rights of 
religious minorities. Ivers documents the Court's growing dis-
